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‘That ugly treason of mistrust’: rhetoric of credit and the credit of rhetoric in The 




In 2016, four hundred years after Shakespeare’s death, ‘post-truth’ was selected as the 
Oxford English Dictionary’s ‘word of the year’. 2016 was the year of the United 
Kingdom’s referendum on whether it should remain in or leave the European Union, 
and it was the year of the election of Donald Trump to the Presidency of the United 
States. Truth was very much at issue, especially as regards the reporting of news and 
facts in so-called ‘social’ and so-called ‘mainstream’ media. One especially lamentable 
feature of our post-truth world, and one that has special resonance with The Merchant 
of Venice, is the casting of doubt upon the nature and extent of the Jewish Holocaust, 
the Shoah.1 Lies levelled at the Jewish people form a line that stretches far back into 
history, for the fact is that the post-truth world – or a world in which evidence-based 
claims about fact and truth are suspect – is not news. Doubt about words and images, 
including reports of news, was already a strong current of concern in Shakespeare’s day 
and it appears as a strong current in Shakespeare’s plays.2 He saw keenly that a major 
human cost of living in a world without truth is that one finds oneself in a world without 
trust. Or, which may be more accurate, that one finds oneself in a world where trust in 
individuals is replaced by trust in material stuff or trust in mechanisms, such as legal 
procedures, that are supposed to operate impartially and independently of individual 
will.3 Shylock’s experience in The Merchant of Venice shows that both species of trust, 
 
1 Deborah Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory (London: 
Penguin Books, 1993). 
2 Lorna Hutson, The Invention of Suspicion: Law and Mimesis in Shakespeare and Renaissance Drama 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
3 Niklas Luhmann, ‘Trust’, in Trust and Power: Two Works by Niklas Luhmann, trans. H. Davies, et al. 




whether in individuals or in institutions, may be suspect. The problem is that the social 
cost can be very significant where such suspicions are widely held.4 Post-trust is as 
dangerous as post-truth. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the adjective ‘post-
truth’ as ‘relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less 
influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief’.5 A 
post-trust society is one in which personal belief shrinks to belief in oneself above all 
others. Shakespeare opened up the casket of these concerns for his own time, but we 
will find that his insights can still serve today to help us to distinguish coverage we 
should believe in from coverings of a deceiving sort, between people and performances 
that are creditworthy and those we should properly mistrust. 
 
1. Credit clauses 
‘In sooth’. The first words of The Merchant of Venice belong to a set that I will call 
‘credit clauses’. Spoken by Antonio, they are echoed in Portia’s ‘By my troth’ at the 
very start of the second scene. The play has many other instances, including ‘believe 
me’, ‘trust me’, ‘truly’ and ‘in truth’.6 The habit of using credit clauses continues in our 
quotidian conversations today, so we find ourselves habitually commencing speech 
with such statements as ‘honestly, I…’, ‘trust me, I…’, ‘believe me...’ and ‘to tell you 
the truth…’. Such filler phrases serve as commonplace clauses in our social contracts. 
Credit clauses are typically used casually and not in any deliberately calculating way. 
They nevertheless operate – often at the very vanguard of a speaker’s narrative – to 
 
4 Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Macmillan, 
1995); Piotr Sztompka, Trust: A Sociological Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
5 https://languages.oup.com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-2016 (online). 
6 In Act 1 scene 1, the phrase ‘believe me’ passes like bad credit from Salanio to Antonio to Gratiano. 
In Act 2 scene 2 it is Gratiano who seeks credit with the words ‘trust me’ and in Act 3 scene 5 ‘truly’ is 
uttered four times by the false servant Lancelet Giobbe in his short private dialogue with Jessica. It is 
Portia who says ‘In truth’ (1.2.54). 
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enhance the audience’s belief in the veracity, sincerity and reliability of the speaker’s 
speech. In Aristotelian terms, we can say that credit clauses operate rhetorically to 
establish the speaker’s trustworthiness as an aspect of their ethos. Without realizing it, 
speakers might even use them to convince themselves of their own veracity. At their 
subtle best, credit clauses operate upon the hearer’s subconscious by implying 
trustworthiness without putting credibility expressly in issue. In Julius Caesar, Brutus’s 
clumsy attempt to establish ethos with a credit clause – ‘Believe me for mine honour’ 
(JC 3.2.14–15) – failed in part because it was too overt. In Measure for Measure, 
Angelo fares no better with his ‘Believe me, on mine honour, / My words express my 
purpose’. He is immediately rebuked by Isabella for putting his honour in issue: ‘Ha? 
little honour, to be much believ’d, / And most pernicious purpose! Seeming, seeming!’ 
(MM 2.4.146–9). King John, which was written almost exactly contemporaneous with 
The Merchant of Venice, contains in one short passage a most efficient example of 
credit clauses being juxtaposed to more conscious concern for the credibility of reported 
news. Constance says:  
I trust I may not trust thee, for thy word 
Is but the vain breath of a common man: 
Believe me, I do not believe thee, man;  
(KJ 3.1.7–9) 
 
Clearly, The Merchant of Venice is by no means unique amongst Shakespeare’s 
dramatic works in containing a great many credit clauses, but it is unique in that the 
entire play is prefaced with a credit clause. It is also the only one of Shakespeare’s plays 
in which the phrase ‘believe me’ appears three times in a scene, and, significantly, that 
scene is the very first of the play. From the outset, the language of credibility sounds 
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the keynote for the play’s rich linguistic composition of trust correlates – including 
‘truth’, ‘troth’, ‘sooth’, ‘belief’, ‘credit’– and it sounds the keynote for the themes of 
truth and trust that drive all material plot points of the drama – the ‘pound of flesh’ 
bond, the lovers’ bonds and the choice of Portia’s casket. 
The casket scene which stands at the structural centre of The Merchant Venice 
contains the play’s most sustained excursus on its central theme of credit and deceit, 
and it does so with a particular focus on the deceiving capacity of eloquent and 
ornamental rhetoric. Bassanio’s speech begins with lines which recall the creation of 
the ‘pound of flesh’ bond made between Shylock and Antonio and which anticipate the 
trial of its terms before the Duke: ‘So may the outward shows be least themselves, / 
The world is still deceived with ornament. / In law, what plea so tainted and corrupt, / 
But, being seasoned with a gracious voice, / Obscures the show of evil?’ (3.2.74–8). 
This is the classic Platonic critique of rhetoric. As Socrates says in Plato’s Gorgias: 
‘there is no need to know the truth of the actual matters, but one merely needs to have 
discovered some device of persuasion which will make one appear to those who do not 
know to know better than those who know’.7 Plato’s criticism is somewhat overblown, 
for it downplays the central place of credibility as an aspect of persuasive ethos, and 
the part that reputation (including reputed expertise) plays in producing credibility. 
Around the time that Aristotle was formulating his idea of rhetorical ethos, the elderly 
Isocrates was writing that ‘words carry greater conviction when spoken by men of good 
repute’. Is it not the case, he asked, that ‘the argument that is made by a man’s life is of 
more weight than that which is furnished by words?’8  
 
7 Plato, Gorgias, trans. W. R. M. Lamb, Loeb Classical Library (Mass: Harvard University Press, 1929), 
459c. 




For Aristotle, a persuasive rhetor must be credible and to be credible the rhetor 
must be ethical. In his definitive statement on ethos as a necessary feature of persuasive 
speech, he asserts that: 
Persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is 
so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully 
and more readily than others: … personal goodness revealed by the speaker … 
may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses.9 
 
We still describe a person as being ‘good for a debt’ if they are able to repay it, but we 
are not likely nowadays to confuse the qualitative measure of a debtor’s moral goodness 
with more quantitative measures of the debtor’s financial ability to repay money. 
Economic language has ousted the ethical – talk of credit as a quality of character has 
been replaced by ‘credit ratings’ and ‘credit scores’. In early modern England, moral 




Antonio is a good man. 
BASSANIO 
Have you heard any imputation to the contrary? 
JEW 
Ho, no, no, no, no. My meaning in saying he is a good man is to have you 
understand me that he is sufficient  
 
9 Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, trans. J. H. Freese, Loeb Classical Library (Mass: Harvard University 





Similar confusion occurred with regard to usury, which is the Venetian Christians’ key 
complaint against Shylock the Jewish moneylender. Thomas Wilson asserted in 
A Discourse Upon Usury that biting usury tends ‘to the vtter discreditinge of merchants 
wholye’,10 citing Aristotle for the view that money ‘is ye suerty for mens dealings: & 
wtout money no man doubtlesse could tel how to trade or bargaine’.11 Elsewhere in the 
Discourse we find a passage that is most pertinent to our appreciation of Shylock’s 
offer to lend money to Antonio free of interest. Wilson gives the example of an 
apothecary who makes an interest-free loan to a physician in the expectation that the 
physician will give the apothecary exclusive preference in future business. Is this usury? 
Wilson concludes that it is not, ‘because the Apothecarie doth not take any thing, to be 
valued or measured, by money ouer & aboue his principall, but onelye the fauour of the 
Phisicion’.12 In similar vein, Shylock stated that it was also in the hope of personal 
favour, or to ‘be friends’, that he offered his loan interest-free to Antonio. In the deal 
as Shylock offers it, monetary interest is replaced by repayment through friendship – 
the quality most prized by rhetoricians for producing credit of character as an aspect of 
ethos. Recall the prime place of friendship in Mark Antony’s oration in Caesar’s 
funeral: ‘Friends, Romans, countrymen… He was my friend, faithful and just to me’ 
(JC 3.2.74, 86). In resorting to friendship in this way, Shakespeare may have been 
influenced directly or indirectly by Cicero’s essay ‘On Friendship’, in which the 
greatest Roman rhetorician of them all goes to great lengths to contrast the uncountable 
 
10 Thomas Wilson, A Discourse Upon Usury (London: Richard Tottel, 1572), 102. 
11 Ibid., 112. 




quality of friendship with things that can be measured numerically: ‘everybody could 
tell how many goats and sheep he had, but was unable to tell the number of his friends’.13  
As an audience, should we trust Shylock’s friendly performance when creating 
the bond? If not, should we not equally mistrust Portia’s appeal to mercy when holding 
him to it? Maybe Shylock was correct in his assessment of Antonio’s and Bassanio’s 
chronic mistrust, when he complains that their ‘own hard dealings teaches them 
suspect / The thoughts of others’ (1.3.157–8). We might even dare to ask whether 
Antonio was correct in his belief that Bassanio was a true friend all along. Shylock at 
no stage before his defeat at trial asks for money from Antonio over and above the 
return of his principal. In contrast, the suspicion hanging over the financially 
compromised Bassanio is that money is always in the mix of his motives. Bassanio’s 
professed love for Antonio and Portia may be mendacious cover for motives that are, 
at base, monetary. In the account that Bassanio makes to Antonio of Portia’s moral 
virtues, he cannot resist resorting to monetary language as he talks of the ‘undervalued 
… worth’ of the ‘lady richly left’ (1.1.161–76). He likens her to the Golden Fleece that 
Jason won,14 and his true confederate Gratiano echoes the allegory later in the play 
(3.2.240) to give the sense that Bassanio and Gratiano have always been a pair of 
merchant venturers ‘on the make’.  
 
2. False witness and fake news 
In addition to ‘credit clauses’ that tend directly to commend our credit to the audience, 
there are statements that operate indirectly to improve our credit by casting doubt on 
the credibility of others. When a performer employs the rhetoric of suspicion and 
 
13 Marcus Tullius Cicero, Laelius de Amicitia, trans. William Armistead Falconer, Loeb Classical Library 
(Cambridge: Mass Harvard University Press, 2014), 17.62. 
14 On the Golden Fleece and mythological allusions, see Janice Valls-Russell’s chapter in this volume. 
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mistrust it serves to elicit credibility for the rhetorician’s own performance. This 
rhetorical dynamic is employed in the world of ‘post-truth’ politics whenever, for 
example, a speaker alerts their audience to ‘fake news’ and other such false fabrications. 
The speaker would have us believe that a special virtue of honest people is their ability 
to perceive falsehood in others. We would be wrong to believe it, for an artful liar knows 
best how to raise the credit of their own character by pointing to the dishonesty of 
others. Shakespeare’s Machiavellian villains, such as Iago (Oth), Edmund (KL) and 
Don John (MA), supply some of the best examples of this technique, but the lowly 
clown figure of The Merchant of Venice, Lancelet Giobbe, provides examples too. (His 
name is usually rendered ‘Launcelot Gobbo’, but in his Arden 3 edition John Drakakis 
reinstates the original pun on the Lancet as a surgical instrument that pricks through 
appearances. This is a choice most apt to the Clown’s role and to the theme of mistrust 
running through the play.) Lancelet seeks to enhance his own ethos as ‘“…honest 
Lancelet; / … honest Giobbe”, or, as aforesaid, “Honest Lancelet Giobbe …”’ (2.2.6–
8) by reporting that his conscience compels him to leave Shylock, who he calls ‘the 
devil himself’ (2.2.23). Later, when he encounters Bassanio in the street, he seeks to 
impress his honesty upon Bassanio with report of Shylock’s offences. Note his use of 
a ‘credit clause’: ‘To be brief, the very truth is that the Jew, having done me wrong…’ 
(2.2.123–4). 
Should we believe Lancelet’s claim to be honest, or should we prefer the 
evidence of Shylock who does not trust him to look after his house? (1.3.170–72) If the 
question of credibility is a question of character, Lancelet’s performance in the scene 
with his ‘true-begotten father’ (2.2.31–2) suggests that Shylock’s assessment is the true 
one and leads us to suspect that Lancelet’s account of Shylock is slanderous. Lancelet’s 
instinct upon encountering (Old) Giobbe in the street is to abuse his father’s trust by 
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making sport of his blindness. How perverse, and yet so fitting to this drama of mistrust, 
that even as he performs the biblical Jacob’s trick of seeking his blind father’s blessing, 
it is given to the untrue and untrustworthy Lancelet to utter the commonplace that ‘truth 
will come to light’ (2.2.73–4) and, in a phrase which Shakespeare may have coined 
here, that ‘truth will out’ (2.2.75). It might come naturally to a liar to speak so 
knowingly of universal truth and the falseness of others. Lancelet’s testimony against 
Shylock is not the last time that Shylock seems to suffer false witness. It could even be 
that Jessica was lying when she said: 
When I was with him, I have heard him swear 
To Tubal and to Chus, his countrymen,  
That he would rather have Antonio’s flesh 
Than twenty times the value of the sum 
That he did owe him; and I know, my lord, 
If law, authority and power deny not,  
It will go hard with poor Antonio. 
(3.2.283–9) 
 
We know that Jessica is not honest to a fault in the way that, say, Lear’s daughter 
Cordelia is. For one thing, Jessica steals Shylock’s wealth. For another, she lies directly 
to her father when she falsely reports what Lancelet had whispered to her: ‘His words 
were “Farewell mistress”, nothing else’ (2.5.43). We cannot know if she is a true 
witness to her father’s hateful words or if she is speaking to ingratiate herself with her 
new Christian company, but there is prescient truth in her instinct, originating no doubt 
in her upbringing in the Jewish ghetto, that any trust her father might place in law and 
the authorities may prove ill-founded. 
 
 10 
Whether Jessica is reporting truly or not, we have good reason to regard as ‘fake 
news’ the reports that flow from the mouths of Salarino and Salanio. They are an odd 
couple who are completely unrealized as characters except in their role as devourers 
and divulgers of news. The shared ‘Sal’ in their names might have suggested to the 
educated early modern playgoer a lustful jumping upon every salacious crumb of 
gossip, bearing in mind the Latin salacis (‘lustful’) and salire (‘to leap’). The word 
‘salacious’ was not in use in Shakespeare’s day, but Portia’s line ‘hot temper leaps o’er 
a cold decree’ (1.2.18) hints that Shakespeare might have felt the Latin connection 
between lust and leaping. ‘Salt’ in English had connotations of lust in Shakespeare’s 
day, and even today the adjective ‘salty’ implies coarseness. In modern French, the 
connection between salt and dirtiness is resonant in the verb ‘salir’, which implies 
‘tainting’. To return this linguistic digression back to Salarino and Salanio, we can note 
that ‘Sal’ connects the several senses of lust, leaping, grasping and tainting to the world 
of money through language of ‘salary’ (derived from salt) and ‘sale’ (derived from an 
original sense of grasping or taking). Salarino and Salanio lust after news and leap to 
tell it. They are conveyers or salesmen of dirty scandal into the ears of anyone who will 
deal with them. Most significantly, their shared ‘Sal’ confirms the impression that they 
operate almost as a single character with two mouths (other confirmation comes early 
on, when Salarino swears by two-headed Janus [1.1.50]). Salarino and Salanio are two 
tongues with a shared taste for salty gossip. The dramaturgical reason for their joint 
operation is, I submit, that Shakespeare intended them to perform as a variant of the 
stock vice figure Rumour with his customary coat of many tongues.  
The text of The Merchant of Venice is believed to have been completed 
sometime between August 1596 and September 1597. The First Part of Henry IV 
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(hereafter 1H4) was written or finalized almost exactly contemporary with it,15 with 
The Second Part (2H4) following around a year later. 1H4 is intensely imbued with 
concerns about counterfeit appearances and 2H4 begins with an induction spoken by 
Rumour. The opening stage direction reads ‘Enter RUMOUR painted full of tongues’. 
The evidence is strong that Shakespeare had Rumour in mind as he wrote The Merchant 
of Venice. Salarino even finishes one of his news reports with the caveat ‘if my gossip 
Report be an honest woman of her word’ (3.1.6–7), which is almost certainly a 
reference to the folk figure of the gossiping woman who has sometimes been called 
‘Dame Rumour’. In their long dialogue at the start of 2.8, we witness Salarino and 
Salanio weaving their knowing narrative from threads of things they claim to have seen 
in person and threads of news drawn from what others have allegedly reported. Thus 
we have Salarino’s ‘in their ship I am sure Lorenzo is not’ (2.8.3) followed by Salanio’s 
‘The villain Jew with outcries raised the Duke’ (2.8.4) and then, Salarino’s ‘the Duke 
was given to understand’ and ‘Antonio certified the Duke / They were not with 
Bassanio in his ship’ (2.8.7, 10–11). Then comes their damning testimony against the 
character of Shylock, from which we are to believe that he makes no distinction 
between his daughter and his money. Salanio says that he saw Shylock running in the 
public place crying ‘My daughter! O, my ducats! O, my daughter!’ (2.8.15), and his 
second tongue, Salarino, backs him up, saying ‘Why, all the boys in Venice follow 
him, / Crying “His stones, his daughter and his ducats!”’ (2.8.23–4). Their testimony is 
the only evidence we have that Shylock acted this way, so should we believe it? We 
might wonder why they would tell lies to each other in private conversation, but that is 
to overlook the fact that they are never alone. They are speaking to each other in the 
 
15 It was ‘probably first performed in the winter of 1596-7’, David Scott Kastan, ed., King Henry IV: 
Part 1, Bloomsbury The Arden Shakespeare, Third Series (London: Thomson, 2002), 2. 
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confidence that a theatre audience is listening in. The character of Rumour who speaks 
the induction to 2H4 makes express reference to the role that the public, including the 
playgoers, perform in spreading false report: 
Rumour is a pipe 
Blown by surmises, Jealousy’s, conjectures, 
And of so easy and so plain a stop 
That the blunt monster with uncounted heads, 
The still discordant wav’ring multitude, 
Can play upon it. But what need I thus 
My well-known body to anatomize 
Among my household? Why is Rumour here?  
(2H4 Induction 15–22) 
 
If we ask of The Merchant of Venice ‘is Rumour here?’ the answer is affirmative. 
Rumour’s pipe is played by Salarino and Salanio and by numerous other characters in 
the play, while the eavesdropping playgoers are conscripted to play along. The false 
music of Salarino and Salanio falls to a low pitch when Salarino reports: 
I reasoned with a Frenchman yesterday 
Who told me, in the narrow seas that part 
The French and English, there miscarried 
A vessel of our country richly fraught. 
I thought upon Antonio when he told me, 




We can scarce believe that such a mouth as Salarino could ever wish ‘in silence’. 
Salanio is truer to their talkative spirit when he urges ‘You were best to tell Antonio 
what you hear’ (2.8.33). There is reason to believe that Salarino had not been silent at 
all, but had rather spread abroad the salty rumour of Antonio’s wrecked ship. In the 
following act, when Salanio asks ‘Now, what news on the Rialto?’, we are not surprised 
at Salarino’s reply: 
Why, yet it lives there unchecked that Antonio hath a ship of rich lading 
wracked on the narrow seas. The Goodwins, I think, they call the place: a very 
dangerous flat, and fatal, where the carcasses of many a tall ship lie buried, as 
they say, if my gossip Report be an honest woman of her word.  
(3.1.2–7)16 
 
Of course it lives there ‘unchecked’, for, as Rumour himself asks in 2H4, who can 
‘stop / The vent of hearing when loud Rumour speaks?’ (Induction 1–2). The lesson for 
our own age is that no amount of fact-checking will check the wind of a good story 
when it is in full flow. Salarino is speaking figuratively. There is no woman out there 
spreading the news; there is no ‘gossip Report’. To find the characters Rumour and 
Report we need look no further than Salarino and Salanio. So it is in 2H4, where, though 
news flows from many mouths, it all shares one source in the person of Rumour: ‘not 
a man of them brings other news / Than they have learnt of me. From Rumour’s 
tongues’ (2H4, Induction 37–9). Like Rumour in 2H4, Salarino whipped up the wind 
of fake news from the outset of the play (in the opening scene, he talks of ‘My wind’ 
[1.1.21]). In the first scene, he contemplates Antonio’s ship wrecked on ‘shallows’ and 
 
16 The grain of truth here is the specific reference to the Goodwin Sands, which has for many years been 
a notorious shipwreck site on the Thames estuary. Shakespeare also refers to it in King John (5.5.12–13), 
a play almost exactly contemporary with The Merchant. 
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‘flats’ and ‘What harm a wind too great might do at sea’ (1.1.25, 23). He speaks of a 
‘stop’, but the pair cannot stop, for they are Rumour itself: 
SALANIO 
I would she were as lying a gossip in that as ever knapped ginger, or made 
her neighbours believe she wept for the death of a third husband. But it is 
true, without any slips of prolixity, or crossing the plain highway of talk, 
that the good Antonio, the honest Antonio, – O, that I had a title good 
enough to keep his name company! – 
SALARINO 
Come, the full stop. 
SALANIO 
Ha, what sayest thou? Why, the end is, he hath lost a ship.  
(3.1.8–17) 
 
Salanio’s image of Dame Rumour chewing a spicy morsel of gossip as one chews 
(knapps) ginger has a partner in a passage of 1H4, in which Hotspur, having called for 
his wife to sing ‘her’ song and having been rebuffed with ‘Not mine, in good sooth’ 
(3.1.242), rails at length against her slovenly use of the common credit clause ‘in good 
sooth’ (similar, it will be recalled, to the one with which Antonio opens The Merchant 
of Venice). He tells her to ‘leave “in sooth,” / And such protest of pepper gingerbread’ 
(3.1.250–51).17 His objection is not that she uses a credit clause (he is content that she 
should utter a ‘good mouth-filling oath’ [1H4 3.1.250]), but only that she should forbear 
to swear in the language that commoners use.  
 
17 David Scott Kastan’s Arden edition of 1H4 contains an introductory section expressly devoted to 
‘counterfeiting and kings, credit and credibility: economic language in the play’ (London: Bloomsbury, 
2002), 62–8.  
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Later in the play, the messenger Salerio brings news that all of Antonio’s ships 
have been wrecked. Salarino, Salanio…and now Salerio! Rumour has grown yet 
another head and found yet another tongue. Bassanio is naturally incredulous that all 
Antonio’s ships should have been wrecked: 
But is it true, Salerio? 
Have all his ventures failed? What, not one hit, 
From Tripoli, from Mexico and England, 
From Lisbon, Barbary and India  
(3.2.265–8) 
 
Salerio confirms ‘Not one, my lord’ (3.2.270). It turns out that he was wrong, or that he 
was lying, for at the end of the play Portia reveals that three of Antonio’s ships survived. 
My own suspicion is that Salerio’s letter is simply blowing into Belmont the rumour 
that Salanio and Salarino had first whispered on the Rialto. The facts presented in the 
play give us no way to know if one of Antonio’s ships was wrecked as Salanio and 
Salarino report, or whether they worked together to spin that fact out of a supposition. 
It matters, because if these gossips are guilty of malicious falsehood, we must doubt 
their narrative about Shylock’s behaviour. We should doubt on grounds of prejudice 
alone from the moment they describe him as ‘the devil… in the likeness of a Jew’ 
(3.1.19–20). We might conclude in the words of the Duke in Othello (the play that 
carries Shakespeare’s most extensive excursus on problems of proof)18 that ‘There is 
no composition in these news / That gives them credit’ (Oth 1.3.1–2). 
 
18 Gary Watt, ““To read him by his form”: Shakespeare on the matter of proof’, in Jean-Pierre Schandeler 
and Nathalie Vienne-Guerrin, eds, Les Usages de la preuve d’Henri Estienne à Jeremy Bentham (Laval: 




Rumour will sometimes arise from prejudice, but it can also be as 
undiscriminating as the wind. Salanio and Salarino cannot resist the chance to blow 
their news into Shylock’s ear, even though this will harm Antonio by diminution of his 
reputational credit:  
SALANIO 
How now, Shylock, what news among the merchants? 
… 
SALARINO 
… do you hear whether Antonio have had any loss at sea or no? 
(3.1.21, 37–8) 
 
In this scene, Shakespeare shows double-tongued Rumour ‘Stuffing the ears of men 
with false reports’ (2H4 Induction 8). Shylock’s ear is greedy for news. When Tubal 
enters, Shylock asks ‘what news from Genoa?’ (3.1.72). The lines that follow are 
crammed with senses (and sounds) of ears, hearing and news. We have Tubal’s hearsay 
evidence: ‘I did hear of her’ (3.1.74), ‘as I heard in Genoa’ (3.1.89–90), ‘in Genoa, as 
I heard’ (3.1.98), ‘I spoke with some of the sailors’ (3.1.94) and ‘Antonio’s creditors 
… swear he cannot choose but break’ (3.1.102–4), alongside Shylock’s ‘jewels in her 
ear’ (3.1.81), ‘No news’ (3.1.82), ‘Is it true, is it true?’ (3.1.93), his credulous ‘good 
news, good news! Ha, ha, heard in Genoa!’ (3.1.96–7) and even, perhaps, (in punning 
form) ‘hearsed’ (3.1.81). Tubal is not reporting what he has seen, but only what others 
report that they have seen. His testimony is hearsay and attributed to unnamed 
anonymous sources. It is most doubtful evidence to establish the fact of Antonio’s loss. 
Be that as it may, Tubal’s news is lodged like a jewel in Shylock’s ear and he readily 




But Antonio is certainly undone. 
JEW 
Nay, that’s true; that’s very true. 
(3.1.112–13) 
 
3. Trust to law 
 
The choice between trust to friendship and trust to law is at issue between Shylock and 
Antonio from their first meeting. Before Antonio’s arrival, Bassanio urges Shylock to 
trust in Antonio’s character. Shylock might, but not without the assurance of legal 
security:  
JEW 
I think I may take his bond. 
BASSANIO 
Be assured you may. 
JEW 
I will be assured I may; and, that I may be assured, I will bethink me.  
(1.3.24–8) 
 
When Antonio speaks, any possibility of reaching a friendly arrangement with Shylock 
quickly evaporates: ‘If thou wilt lend this money, lend it not / As to thy friends, … / 
But lend it rather to thine enemy’ (1.3.127–30). 
Whether to trust to law, or to love and friendship, is a perennial question. In the 
mercantile and moneyed world of The Merchant of Venice, most characters trust to 
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both. That the question is a perennial one is clear from the daily drama of modern courts. 
A case from 2016 (that year again) will serve as an illustration. In Adams v. Moore,19 
the judge, His Honour Judge Platts, commenced his judgment by saying ‘This is a sad 
case’. The melancholy opening recalls Antonio’s ‘I know not why I am so sad’. The 
parties to the case had been friends, but had fallen out over their business venture. In 
matters of money, the judge points to the need for trust in law alongside trust in friends:  
… these intelligent, educated partners with experience in business chose to 
embark on this venture without formalising the arrangements. That does speak 
volumes as to their mutual friendship and trust at the time, but I am sure that a 
failure to consider at the outset the true nature of the venture has led to the 
situation which they now find themselves in.20 
 
A formal partnership might have suited the parties’ intentions best, but another 
possibility was to use a trust. This device, which can be employed for sharing ownership 
of assets, including profits from commercial ventures, was developed by the equity 
jurisdiction of the English High Court of Chancery and formerly went by the name of 
the ‘use’.21 It is with that name that Shakespeare refers to it when Antonio requests that 
Shylock should give half of his goods (the half awarded to Antonio by the court) ‘in 
use, to render it, / Upon his death unto the gentleman / That lately stole his daughter’ 
(4.1.379–81). In other words, Antonio proposes that there should be a ‘use’ or ‘trust’ 
of those assets for his benefit during Shylock’s lifetime and on Shylock’s death that the 
benefit should pass to Lorenzo (and thereby indirectly to Jessica also). This is said to 
 
19 [2016] EWHC 3666 (QB). The citation indicates a case heard in the Queen’s Bench Division (QB) of 
The High Court of Justice in the jurisdiction of England and Wales (EWHC). 
20 Ibid., Para.[8]. 
21 N. G. Jones, ‘Wills, Trusts and Trusting from the Statute of Uses to Lord Nottingham’, Journal of 
Legal History 31 (2010), 273–98; Gary Watt, Equity Stirring: The Story of Justice Beyond Law (Oxford: 
Hart, 2009), 120-24. 
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be a settlement (on ‘use’ or ‘trust’) ‘pur autre vie’, which is to say that Antonio’s 
interest in the assets comes to an end not when Antonio dies but when another named 
person (in this case Shylock) dies. Ironically, given Shylock’s threat to kill Antonio, 
Shylock’s only chance to enjoy again a personal benefit in that half of his wealth lies 
in the possibility that Antonio might predecease Shylock, in which event the benefit 
would jump back to (that is, ‘result’ to) Shylock until his death.22 
The Chancery trust originated in a personal obligation of trust reposed by one 
party in another, which the King’s Lord Chancellor would enforce to require the trustee 
to fulfil the duty which in good conscience he ought to fulfil. Over time, the trust came 
to grant ownership of the property which could bind third parties who had no actual 
relationship of trust with the original parties. In this way, the Chancery trust moved 
from trust between people to trust in property and trust in judicial process, hence Lord 
Mansfield’s observation: ‘now the trust in this court is the same as the land, and the 
trustee is considered merely as an instrument of conveyance’.23 We might even say that 
the Chancery trust is nowadays most useful precisely where personal trust between the 
parties is most lacking.24 For Shylock the final indignity is being forced to confess faith 
in his enemy’s God and being forced to trust his wealth into his enemy’s hands, and all 
by a court in which he had placed his trust. 
 
4. Love on trial 
A striking feature of The Merchant of Venice is how little the characters trust each other, 
and how little deserving of trust they are. Even lovers mistrust each other and put their 
credit to constant trial. Does Portia suspect a mercenary motive behind Bassanio’s suit? 
 
22 On the technicalities, see Mark Edwin Andrews, Law Versus Equity in The Merchant of Venice 
(Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1965), 74. 
23 Burgess v Wheate (1759) 1W Bl 123, 162; 96 ER 67, 84. 
24 See, generally, Roger Cotterrell, ‘Trusting in Law: Legal and Moral Concepts of Trust’ (1993) CLP 75.  
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When he says ‘Let me choose / For, as I am, I live upon the rack’ (3.2.24–5), she seizes 
the opportunity to test him:  
PORTIA 
Upon the rack, Bassanio? Then confess 
What treason there is mingled with your love. 
BASSANIO 
None but that ugly treason of mistrust, 
Which makes me fear th’enjoying of my love. 
… 
PORTIA 
Ay, but I fear you speak upon the rack, 
Where men enforced do speak anything. 
BASSANIO 
Promise me life and I’ll confess the truth. 
PORTIA 
Well then, confess and live.  
(3.2.26–7, 32–5) 
 
It is all very playful, of course, but in a play that is full of questionable credit, the 
playwright seems to be saying that embracing lovers trust each other at arms-length, 
even as merchants and moneylenders do. Writing to Bassanio, Antonio also hints at 




all debts are cleared between you and I if I might but see you at my death. 
Notwithstanding, use your pleasure; if your love do not persuade you to come, 
let not my letter.  
(3.2.317–20) 
 
Antonio suspected mistrust when he thought Bassanio did not credit him to put up the 
loan in the first place: ‘out of doubt you do me now more wrong / In making question 
of my uttermost / Than if you had made waste of all I have’ (1.1.155–7). It will be 
recalled that Antonio had from the outset been willing to undergo torture for Bassanio’s 
sake: 
Try what my credit can in Venice do, 
That shall be racked even to the uttermost 
To furnish thee to Belmont to fair Portia. 
Go presently inquire, and so will I, 
Where money is, and I no question make 
To have it of my trust, or for my sake.  
(1.1.180–85) 
 
Portia, Bassanio and Antonio are triangulated in courtly trials of love in which they 
subject each other to inquisition and counter-question. They are always trying what 
their credit can do in a world of mistrust. Quibbles between Jessica and Lorenzo take 
similar form. She tests him: 
JESSICA 
Who are you? Tell me for more certainty, 




Lorenzo, and thy love. 
JESSICA 
Lorenzo certain, and my love indeed, 
For who love I so much? And now, who knows 
But you, Lorenzo, whether I am yours? 
LORENZO 
Heaven and thy thoughts are witness that thou art.  
(2.6.27–33) 
 
And he makes trial of her:  
Beshrew me but I love her heartily, 
For she is wise, if I can judge of her, 
And fair she is, if that mine eyes be true, 
And true she is, as she hath proved herself: 
(2.6.53–6) 
 
Jessica passes Lorenzo’s test, but he nevertheless teases her with jealous mistrust when 
he finds her and Lancelet conversing in a corner (3.5.26–7). She returns the favour: 
JESSICA 
In such a night 
Did young Lorenzo swear he loved her well, 
Stealing her soul with many vows of faith, 




In such a night 
Did pretty Jessica, like a little shrew, 
Slander her love, and he forgave it her.  
(5.1.17–22) 
These little trials culminate in the inquisition to which Bassanio is subjected when he 
confesses to Portia that he gave away the ring she had given him, and which he swore 
never to part with. There is a joinder of this trial with Nerissa’s trial of Gratiano on the 
same matter. In the end, Bassanio comes through this trial, as he also came through the 
trial by ordeal of the casket test. In dismissing the golden casket, Bassanio had rejected 
ornament as false: 
ornament is but the guiled shore  
To a most dangerous sea; the beauteous scarf  
Veiling an Indian beauty; in a word,  
The seeming truth, 
(3.2.97–100) 
Does Bassanio’s protest against deceiving appearances ring true? Did he not, at 
substantial cost to Antonio, dress himself in finery to gain his chance at the casket test? 
When he finds ‘Fair Portia’s counterfeit!’ (3.2.115) in the lead casket, did he not praise 
it excessively? Did he not adopt the visual language of legal formalism – the language 
of the sign – when he wished his victory to be ‘confirmed, signed, ratified’ (3.2.148) 
by Portia? The more we look upon the debtor Bassanio, the more we doubt his credit. 
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Arguably, the lesson of the caskets is not that surfaces are false and cannot be 
trusted, but only that surfaces should be appreciated more deeply. There is a sense 
recurring in Shakespeare’s works that sensory impressions – sights and sounds – may 
be deceiving, but that love requires us to trust them anyway. In Cymbeline, for example, 
Cymbeline says it would have ‘been vicious / To have mistrusted’ (Cym 5.5.65–6) his 
wife, the Queen, when she looked and sounded so attractive.25 Bassanio preferred lead 
to gold not because he ignored the leaden surface, but because he weighed it up and did 
not judge it solely by its shine: ‘Look on beauty, / And you shall see ’tis purchased by 
the weight’ (3.2.88–9); ‘Thy paleness moves me more than eloquence’ (3.2.106). He 
was also, we suspect, not a little influenced by clues secreted in Portia’s speech (sound 
elements of ‘lead’ are common) and in the song she had instructed the musician to sing 
while Bassanio was choosing (as others have noted, the lines of the song end-rhyme 
with ‘lead’). The lesson may be that we should trust the performance taken as a whole. 
To encourage trust in the show is, of course, very sensible for lovers who wish to avoid 
jealousy, and most prudent for a playwright who wants playgoers to trust the ‘baseless 
fabric’ (Tem 4.1.151) of the play.  
 
5. Trusting the drama 
If The Merchant of Venice is a comedy after all, it is Shakespeare who has the last laugh. 
He persuades the playgoers to believe that Antonio’s ships have all miscarried, but, as 
we noted earlier, in the final Act Portia reveals that three have made it safely home. 
When she tells the assembly, ‘You shall not know by what strange accident / I chanced 
on this letter’ (5.1.278–9), she is asking the playgoers to trust in the show. The ‘strange 
accident’ can only be that Shakespeare himself, descending into the drama as deus ex 
 
25 Further strong examples can be found at the end of Pericles (5.1.110–13) and Sonnet 138. 
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machina, posted the letter to Portia. In scene after scene he stuffs ears with hearsay, 
stuffs eyes with glister and stuffs hands with letters full of lies posted directly from his 
desk (including one in which Bellario, a learned Doctor of Law, asserts the bare-faced 
lie that Portia is the lawyer Balthazar). We are so occupied in scrutinizing the play’s 
falsehoods and its lessons about truth that we do not notice that the one telling us about 
lies is the one telling the lies.  
As The Merchant concludes with the metatheatrical conceit of Portia’s 
accidental letter, so 2H4 concludes with an epilogue standing outside the world of the 
play in which we hear the playwright speaking directly to us. As a counterpoint to 
Rumour’s induction, it ties the play back to metatheatrical concern with playgoers’ 
willingness to believe the show. It contains a sort of ‘credit clause’ that echoes the 
standard formal opening of a legal deed ‘noverint universi per presentes’ (In As You 
Like It, Rosalind translates this as ‘Be it known unto all men by these presents’ [1.2.117-
8]): 
Be it known to you, as it is very well, I was lately here in the end of a 
displeasing play to pray your patience for it and to promise you a better. I meant 
indeed to pay you with this, which, if like an ill venture it come unluckily home, 
I break, and you, my gentle creditors, lose. Here I promised you I would be, and 
here I commit my body to your mercies. Bate me some, and I will pay you some 
and, as most debtors do, promise you infinitely. (2H4 Epilogue 1, 7–16) 
 
This epilogue, with its talk of breaking with creditors, of a venture coming home, and 
of a body at a creditor’s mercy, fits The Merchant of Venice every bit as well as it fits 
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the play it was written for. Surely Shakespeare had both plays in mind at the same time, 
even if The Merchant is unlikely to be the ‘displeasing play’ referred to.26   
At the end of The Merchant, Portia’s accidental letter performs the epilogue’s 
part of reminding us that we are watching a play and that the playwright has been asking 
us to believe in a work of artifice. Did we really believe that Shylock planned to kill 
Antonio from the outset? Or that the actions of the disguised Portia would match the 
mercy of her ornamental speech? Or that the court would enforce the flesh bond? Did 
the original playgoers believe that blood would be shed on the stage – a stage that would 
not have been draped in tragedy’s customary black, but decked in the colours of 
comedy? The material evidence was always before the playgoers’ eyes. In line after 
line of text the playwright tells his audience to doubt all ornamental show, but still he 
persuades us to suspend our disbelief. The Duke voices the playgoers’ subconscious 
doubts about the performed ‘act’ when he says ‘Shylock, the world thinks, and I think 
so too, / That thou but leadest this fashion of thy malice / To the last hour of act’ 
(4.1.16–18). Far from making the playgoers conscious of their doubts, his words of 
doubt chime with their thoughts and thereby enhance the veracity and reality of the 
play. We, the audience, are willingly gulled. We accept the show, as we accept the truth 
of a lover’s lies. 
The Duke, Salarino and Salanio are not the only characters to align themselves 
with an external or metatheatrical point of view. Lorenzo seems to speak on behalf of 
the poet when he praises poetic language and decries its abuse by Lancelet Giobbe: ‘I 
do know / A many fools … / Garnished like him, that for a tricksy word / Defy the 
matter’ (3.5.60–6). This talk of dressing that obscures the matter, following Lancelet’s 
 
26 1H4 is the better candidate because of the controversy arising from the name of Oldcastle that was first 
associated with the character of John Falstaff. See the introductory notes to James C. Bulman’s Arden 
edition, Third Series (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 133–42.  
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‘for the meat, sir, it shall be covered’ (3.5.55–6), calls to this writer’s mind passages in 
Thomas Wilson’s The Arte of Rhetorique: 
him cunne I thanke, that both can and will ever, mingle sweete among the sower, 
be he Preacher, Lawyer, yea, or Cooke either hardly, when hee dresseth a good 
dish of meate.27 
 
and  
Now an eloquent man being smally learned can much more good in perswading 
by shift of wordes, and meete placing of matter: then a great learned clarke 
shalbe able with great store of learning, wanting words to set forth his 
meaning.28  
 
Wilson claims as a virtue the very thing that Plato decried as a vice – that it is more 
pleasing to be served lesser meat dressed in a good sauce than to be served good meat 
with a poor sauce. Shakespeare clearly agreed with the need for good sauce, though 
ideally as an enhancement for good meat rather than a cover for bad. I think we can 
hear his voice in Lorenzo’s objection to words that mar the matter. It is only when the 
outer dressing is unrelated to the inner matter, so that it can in no way express, enhance 
or emphasize the substance, that the outside loses its quality of being true. This might 
happen, say, if one were to order a chicken dish with a sauce so overpowering that it 
becomes impossible to realize that one is really eating pork. It matters when we are 
tricked into swallowing lies. According to Cicero’s account, the Roman actor Polus 
enhanced his performance of Electra mourning her brother by bringing on to stage an 
 
27 Thomas Wilson, The Arte of Rhetorique [London: Richard Grafton, 1553] (1560), ed. G. H. Mair 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), 4.  
28 Ibid., 161. 
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urn with the ashes of his own dead son. Brecht called this ‘barbaric’. He employed a 
metaphor that will now be familiar to us:   
the object is to fob us off with some kind of portable anguish – That’s to say 
anguish that can be detached from its cause, transferred in toto and lent to some 
other cause. The incidents proper to the play disappear like meat in a cunningly 
mixed sauce with a taste of its own.29 
 
Lorenzo’s role is to bear true witness to Shakespeare’s craft, even as at one point he is 
enlisted by Portia to bear false witness to her whereabouts during the time she played 
the lawyer (5.1.270–71). As Bassanio warns us not to trust the one who persuades us 
with sweet speech (‘In law, what plea so tainted and corrupt, / But, being seasoned with 
a gracious voice, / Obscures the show of evil?’ [3.2.75–7]), so Lorenzo warns us not to 
trust the man whom sweet sounds cannot sway: ‘The man that hath no music in 
himself, / Nor is not moved with concord of sweet sounds, / Is fit for treasons, 
stratagems and spoils; … / Let no such man be trusted’ (5.1.83–8). 
If we were to reject the sound of words and the sight of the scene merely because 
they are sensory and superficial, we would throw out the meat with the sauce. As Ben 
Jonson wrote ‘On picture’ (De pictura): ‘Whosoever loves not picture is injurious to 
truth’.30 In 1977, Richard Schechner put it this way: 
the raw material of theatre wherever it is found – is also the stuff that lies are 
made of. As Ekman points out, the face is not only a truth-teller but a liar without 
peer. And lying, as much as truth-telling, is the stock in trade of theatre.31 
 
 
29 Berthold Brecht, Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic, ed. John Willett, [1964] 
(London: Methuen Drama, 2001), 271. 
30 Ben Jonson, Discoveries (London: 1641), 59. 
31 Richard Schechner, Performance Theory [1977] (London: Routledge, 2003), 315. 
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Alongside this we can place Constantin Stanislavski’s assertion in his 1937 work An 
Actor Prepares, that: 
What we mean by truth in the theatre is the scenic truth which an actor must 
make use of in his moments of creativeness. Try always to begin by working 
from the inside, both on the factual and imaginary part of a play and its setting. 
Put life into all the imagined circumstances and actions until you have 
completely satisfied your sense of truth, and until you have awakened a sense 
of faith in the reality of your sensations. This process is what we call justification 
of a part.32 
 
Justice, which has been called giving to each one their due,33 is what the audience 
renders when it commits to give the performance credit where it is due. It takes the form 
of judgment free of prejudice, of suspension of disbelief and, at the end, the approbation 
of applause. Stanislavski writes that: ‘Truth on the stage is whatever we can believe in 
with sincerity, whether in ourselves or in our colleagues. Truth cannot be separated 
from belief, nor belief from truth’.34 The playwright and the actors present a surface, 
the whole surface and nothing but the surface. That done, they make one demand of us 
– that we should believe them when they say, ‘if you prick us, we will bleed’. In fact, 
we never prick them; and they never bleed. We hold the play but as a play because it 
pleases us to do so. We are satisfied with the surface, with the scene. When we probe 
it, that is prove it, we find that a good play is proof against our doubts. The surface 
suffices. We take it for truth, and we trust in it. Only cutting critics of the unkindest sort 
will find false in everything. The reasonable playgoer, who goes ‘kindly to judge’ the 
 
32 Constantin Stanislavski, An Actor Prepares, trans. Elizabeth R Hapgood [1937] (London: Methuen, 
1980), 129. 
33 Justitia suum cuique distribuit (Cicero, De Legibus [c. 43 BC], I, 15, following Aristotle).  
34 Stanislavski, Actor, 129. 
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play (H5 Prologue 34), doesn’t need to see Shylock bleed to accept his humanity, or to 
see the Prince of Morocco bleed who offered to ‘make incision’ (2.1.6) to prove his 
love, or to see Antonio bleed who offered his life for his friend. Trust in surfaces makes 
the world of theatre, as it makes theatre of the world. Antonio sees this when he says: 
I hold the world but as the world, Gratiano,  
A stage, where every man must play a part,  
And mine a sad one.  
(1.1.77–9) 
 
Antonio speaks knowingly of his world of show as if it were our world. Through him 
Shakespeare points to fabrications and in so doing directs our critical gaze away from 
the hand that manufactured everything. The effect is the paradoxical and alienating one 
of making Antonio seem more real. We sense that he needs our trust and that he needs 
something to trust to in an untrustworthy world. Perhaps he needs to love and to be 
loved, not as a merchant of Venice, but as a character in a play. It is in that character 
that Antonio must take his very existence on trust, and this, in sooth, may be why he 
feels so sad. 
